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Abstract 
 
Regardless of the efforts undertaken through the many reforms of the European Convention 
system, non-compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights remains a 
major problem for the Council of Europe. This article asks how we can change state behaviour 
and what role, if any, could damages play in this context. First, the article focuses on how the 
choice of remedy affects compliance and why aggravated or punitive damages look like an 
ideal option to nudge states into compliance. I explore recent arguments by scholars and judges 
who argue that the European Court of Human Rights should actively shift its approach (or 
perhaps already has) to nudge state behaviour towards compliance and prevention of future 
violations. Based on my empirical research, I show that the current case law presents several 
obstacles to the introduction of such damages. Building on the economic analysis of the law 
and insights from behavioural sciences, I reveal how the Court’s approach fails to comply with 
any(!) of the elements needed to incentivize states to change their behaviour. I finally question 
to what extent aggravated or punitive damages can be efficient within a system that relies on 
voluntary compliance. 
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1. Changing State Behaviour  
In March 2018, the Council of Europe published the news that out of all judgments rendered by 
the European Court of Human Rights since its inception 60 years ago, more than half – nearly 
7,500 judgments – still remained unenforced.2 Regardless of the efforts undertaken through the 
many reforms of the Convention system and through the expansion of the Convention to 47 
European jurisdictions, non-compliance with the Court’s judgments remains a major problem for 
the COE. For years, states’ failure to implement the Court’s judgments has threatened to 
undermine the Strasbourg system and simultaneously erode the credibility of the Court. When 
states fail to implement the Court’s judgments, this generates new, repetitive claims before the 
Court. Specifically, the ‘failure to implement effective general measures results in the 
recurrence of similar infringements, producing repetitive applications and distracting the Court 
from its essential function.’3 These repetitive cases represent a considerable part of the Court’s 
backlog. In fact, year-on-year, the number of judgments pending examination before the 
Committee of Ministers, the body responsible for supervising the implementation of 
Strasbourg judgments, has been steadily increasing.4 In parallel, the deficit between the number 
of applications introduced and applications disposed of by the Court continues to grow to the 
extent that victims wait for years before their claims are heard and decisions rendered.5 
Although several attempts have sought to reform the institutional structures and introduce 
procedures to manage the growing backlog of cases more efficiently, the situation is still such 
as to raise concerns as to the viability of the current system and its long-term effectiveness. 6  
In seeking to address the problem, the emphasis has been on thinking creatively about 
the choice of remedies that the Court could impose on states and which would motivate states 
to address their human rights violations at home. Social scientists and economists have 
observed that human behaviour can be changed through three mechanisms of social influence: 
material inducement, persuasion and acculturation.7 Material inducement seeks to influence 
the behaviour of actors by the imposition of material costs or benefits. The imposition of a fine 
will motivate the state to conduct a cost-benefit analysis as to whether a certain behaviour is 
economically sound. If the costs of continuous behaviour outweigh the benefits, then the 
expectation is that the state would cease the costly actions. Whilst material inducement focuses 
on the ‘price’ of a specific behaviour, the second mechanism – persuasion – relies on 
persuading states of the validity or the appropriateness of a specific norm, belief or practice. 
Persuasion occurs when actors – in our case states – assess the content of a particular rule or 
practice and ‘change their mind’. In the language of Harold Koh’s, states obey international 
                                                 
2 Council of Europe, Supervision of the Execution of judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights 2017: 11th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers, March 2018, 7. 
3 A Drzemcczewski, J Gaughan, ‘Implementing Strasbourg Court Judgments: the Parliamentary Dimension’, in 
W Benedek, W Karl and A mihr (eds), European Yearbook on Human Rights 2010, vol II (Antwerp, European 
Academic Press, 2010), 234. 
4 For Statistics: Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of judgments of the European Court of 
human Rights, Annual Reports (2008) Table 1.b Appendix 1: Statistical data, April 2009, 33.  
5 Council of Europe, ‘High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights: Brighton 
Declaration’, April 2012, para 16. See also: Council of Europe, ‘High-level Conference on the “Implementation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared responsibility”’, 27 March 2015; Council of Europe, 
‘Copenhagen Declaration’, April 2018, para 44.  
6 Council of Europe, ‘Draft Copenhagen Declaration’, 5 February 2018, para 43. Council of Europe, ‘High Level 
Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights: Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, 
para 8; Brighton Declaration (n 6), para 5.  
7 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2013.  
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rules because they have ‘internalized’ these norms into their domestic law and practice.8 In this 
regard, the aim of persuasion is not merely to generate compliance but to ‘internalize the new 
interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal normative system.’9 
Finally, acculturation, is the process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns 
of the surrounding culture. Instead of assessing the content or the costs and benefits of 
international norms, acculturation relies on the cognitive and social pressures that create a 
compliance pull. Behavioural economists argue that such cognitive and social pressures 
‘induce change because actors are motivated to minimize cognitive discomfort or social costs 
and to achieve cognitive comfort’.10 In practice, this means that states may be compelled to act 
in a manner compliant with international norms because such behaviour is part of membership 
of a specific group to which states wish to belong. As a consequence, they wish to mirror the 
behaviour of other states and thus remain part of an ‘in-group’ with a shared identity.  
Like other international institutions, the current remedy framework used by the ECtHR 
and by the Committee of Ministers appears to rely on the use of all three tools to motivate the 
state to redress its actions and deter similar future violations. The ECtHR gives a clear emphasis 
on just satisfaction, whereby states have to compensate the victim’s loss and suffering. This is 
sometimes complemented with non-monetary remedies. When the Court is seeking to achieve 
restitution in integrum and return the applicant to the position before the violation, it may order 
the release of a victim being held in arbitrary detention or it may go as far as requiring a state 
to change its legislation to prevent future actions. These remedies are imposed by the Court so 
infrequently that in general, the Court rather remains silent and relies on the persuasive power 
of its ruling.11 The expectation is that the judgment identifies the underlying problem so clearly 
that states are able to undertake the necessary actions to prevent future breaches at home. In 
the final step, the Committee of Ministers’ attempts to adjust state behaviour through 
acculturation by publicly condemning and shaming states.12 The Committee of Ministers, for 
example, calls on states to abide by the Court’s judgments, condemns their failure to do so and 
issues interim resolutions requiring their action. Together both the Court and the Committee of 
Ministers are supposed to provide an efficient and persuasive remedial framework, providing 
for different incentives for states to comply with European human rights judgments.  
Given the poor compliance record of some states and the general 50% failure to execute 
ECtHR judgments, it is evident that the current structure and functioning of remedies is not 
working. The exercise of shaming states into compliance is a function for the Committee of 
Ministers rather than the Court and has been only varyingly successful. In a first global statistical 
analysis of the issue, Hafner-Burton found that whilst governments exposed and shamed as 
human rights violators often improve protections for political rights after being publicly criticized 
(e.g. they hold elections), they rarely cease or decrease their policies of torture and 
disappearances.13 Paradoxically, sometimes, international pressure and disapproval is followed 
by more repression in the short term, prompting leaders and despots to use more strategies of 
terror. In a sense, it may be easier for some governments to reform their legal or political 
structures (e.g. by organising elections or passing legislation to better protect some political 
rights), than to stop agents of terror that are out of their direct control. Another reason, however, 
                                                 
8 Koh specifically focuses on courts and other domestic organs as transnational legal actors giving effect to 
international law at home. Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why do Nations Obey International Law?’, 1997 (106) Yale Law 
Journal, 2599; Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181.  
9 Koh 1997 (n 9): 2646.  
10 Goodman and Jinks 2013 (n 8): 22.  
11 Goodman and Jinks 2013 (n 8): 24. 
12 Goodman and Jinks 2013 (n 8): 27-8.  
13 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem’, 
(2008) 62 International Organization 689.  
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is that some governments abuse human rights strategically. When faced with global pressures 
for reform, some governments offset the improvements they make in response to international 
pressure with terror, such as killings or beatings so as to boost their legitimacy at home.  
Similarly, non-monetary remedies have proven to be only partially successful. In the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, Hawkins and Jacobs have shown that out 
of 908 discrete actions that the Court has imposed, states have complied with 251 of these (i.e. 
28% compliance rate). The rate of compliance decreased the more invasive the remedy was: 
when states had to issue an apology for their behaviour, the compliance rate was 31 percent; 
when states were told to punish perpetrators or restore rights to those who had them taken away, 
compliance had dropped to between 13 and 19%; and finally, when the Court ordered a state to 
amend, repeal or adopt domestic laws or judgments, this was done in only 5% of cases. All these 
scarcely compare to compliance with the payment of moral and material damages (47 and 42%). 
Although no similar study has been undertaken for the ECtHR, which issues non-monetary 
remedies much more reluctantly than the Inter-American Court,14 judges themselves insist that 
the Court faces the same issue with compliance as its Inter-American counterpart.15 In fact, in 
the most recent conference of state parties, the issue of repetitive cases arising from the non-
execution of pilot judgments imposing such non-monetary remedies was explicitly raised as a 
problem.16  
In the end, it is to material inducement that experts seem to turn.17 Article 41 of the 
Convention on ‘just satisfaction’ as the Court’s go-to remedy represents an opportunity for the 
Court to provide a material incentive to states to change their behaviour. As the least 
burdensome and most complied with remedy, it offers the greatest potential for maximising 
deterrence and thus ensuring remedy efficiency. In this context, scholars argue that a damage 
award can go beyond the aim of seeking to compensate the claimant for the harm done to them. 
The imposition of a high fine would motivate the state to conduct a cost-benefit analysis as to 
whether a certain behaviour is economically sound. If the costs of continuous behaviour 
outweighed the benefits, then the expectation is that the state would cease the costly actions. 
Aggravated damages could incentivize states to cease their recalcitrant behaviour and act to 
redress repeat violations and structural problems at home. 18  
Whilst international law has always made use of the material inducement approach to 
change state practices (e.g. Security Council sanctions or World Bank loans conditional on 
compliance),19 the idea of punitive damages has generally been rejected. Neither compensation 
nor satisfaction are intended ‘to punish the responsible State, nor … have an expressive or 
                                                 
14 In his article, the current Vice President of the Court speaks of about 268 cases in which general measures were 
awarded. A. Sicilianos ‘The involvement of the European Court of Human Rights in the Implementation of its 
Judgments: Recent Developments under Article 46 ECHR’, (2014) 32/3 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
235. 
15 Interviews with Judges 8 and 10 of ECtHR, February 2018.  
16 Draft Copenhagen Declaration 2018 (n 6): para 50. 
17 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2015, 402 ff; Paulo 
Pinto de Albuquerque and Anna van Aaken, ‘Punitive Damages in Strasbourg’ in Anne van Aaken/Iulia Motoc 
(eds.), The ECHR and General International Law, Oxford University Press 2017; S. Wittish ‘Awe of the Gods 
and Fear of the Priests: Punitive Damages and the Law of State Responsibility’ 1998 (3) Austrian Review of 
International and European Law 101-157.  
18 On effectiveness of punitive damages in international law: Anne van Aaken, 'Making International Human 
Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational-Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of Ius Standi Provisions' in 
Stefan Voigt, Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen (eds), International Conflict Resolution, Conferences on New 
Political Economy 23 (Siebeck/Mohr 2006): pp. 29-58.  
19 Goodman and Jinks 2013 (n 8): 125. 
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exemplary character’.20 In fact, even when a serious breach of an international obligation has 
occurred, ‘the award of punitive damages is not recognized in international law.’ Even more, 
after the International Law Commission made a proposal for ‘damages reflecting the gravity 
of the breach’, the overwhelmingly negative reaction led the Rapporteur to conclude that ‘the 
idea of punitive damages under international law is currently unsustainable’.21 The ECtHR 
explicitly accepts this approach22 and has until now not considered it appropriate to accept 
claims for damages with labels such as ‘punitive’, ‘aggravated’ or ‘exemplary’.23 Yet, as Judge 
De Albuquerque and Van Aaken note, the rejection of punitive damages does not mean that 
the Court may not in practice already be punishing states for certain types of behaviour.24 In 
Cyprus v Turkey, the same judge argued in his concurring opinion that the Court has ‘awarded 
punitive damages to the claimant State’25 and in Guiso-Gallisay v Italy, the Court more 
generally stated that Article 41 awards must be ‘a serious and effective means of dissuasion 
with regard to the repetition of unlawful conduct of the same type, without however assuming 
a punitive function.’26 The Committee of Ministers has also explicitly supported the use of 
punitive damages to ensure the effectiveness of ECtHR judgments, as has the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, which welcomed the introduction of fines to be imposed 
on states that persistently fail to execute the judgments of the Court, with a view to introducing 
more effective measures in the face of non-compliance.27  
The proposals for the Court to adopt a more assertive approach to damages and adopt 
punitive damages are increasingly vocal, even within the Court.28 With the new mechanisms 
introduced by Protocol 14, which now permit the Committee of Ministers to bring a member 
state before the Court for noncompliance with a previous judgement, the argument is that such 
infringement proceedings now offer an opportunity for the Court to mirror the approach of EU 
courts. In EU law, deterrence is clearly incorporated into the primary law of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union,29 which provides for imposing financial sanctions on 
Member States for non-compliance with the judgments of the EU Court of Justice or the failure 
to transpose Directives. Although no similar (explicit) legal basis exists in Protocol 14, the 
Court’s extensive discretion within Article 41 (or Article 46) would permit it to impose 
damages as a financial incentive on recalcitrant states to nudge them into compliance.30 With 
the first infringement case coming to the Court, the opportunity to adopt such an approach is 
here and now.31  
                                                 
20 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, Part Two, 2001: 99. 
21 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative 
Law), Cambridge University Press 2013: 526.  
22 Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Rules of the Court, 16 April 2018, 61.  
23 Akdivar v Turkey, App no 21893/93 (ECtHR, 16 September 1996); Selçuk and Asker v Turkey, App no 30451/96 
(ECtHR, 25 September 2001). 
24 De Albuquerque, Van Aaken 2017 (n 19).  
25 Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94, (ECtHR, Grand Chamber (Just Satisfaction) 12 May 2014).  
26 Guiso-Gallisay v Italy, App no 58858/00 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber (Just Satisfaction) 22 December 2009), para 
85. 
27 Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly), Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Doc .8808, 2000, para 94. 
28 In fact, a review of the Court’s approach to just satisfaction is currently underway. Interviews with ECtHR 
Judges February and March 2018.  
29 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 260 (2) and (3), 2008 O.J. C 
115/47.  
30 Some also rely on article 46 ECHR.  
31 Committee of Ministers, Execution of the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Ilgar Mammadov 
Against Azerbaijan, Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2017)429 (Dec. 5, 2017) 
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In this article, I show how the choice of remedy affects compliance and why aggravated 
or punitive damages look like an ideal option to nudge states into compliance. Then I turn to 
the most recent proposals arguing for the introduction of aggravated or punitive damages. 
Based on my empirical research,32 I show that the current case law presents several obstacles 
to the introduction of such damages. Building on the economic analysis of the law and insights 
from behavioural sciences, I show how the Court’s approach fails to comply with any(!) of the 
elements needed to incentivize states to change their behaviour. I finally question to what 
extent aggravated or punitive damages can be efficient within a system that relies on voluntary 
compliance. 
2. The Current Compliance Problem and its Link to Remedies 
Traditionally, scholars insist that compliance with human rights decisions depends on the type 
of state and on the participation of citizens in NGOs. In this context, democratic states with an 
active civil society appear to be more likely to comply with human rights norms than autocratic 
regimes with weak civil society.33 Others insist that reputational concerns and social 
conformity explain patterns of compliance. Governments appear to commit and comply with 
legal obligations if other countries in the region do so as well.34 In the European context, for 
example, Falkner and Treib speak of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden as adopting a ‘culture of 
compliance’, whilst contrasting other geographic areas where compliance with decisions is 
weighed against domestic political cost of doing so35 and post-communist jurisdictions where 
law is treated as a ‘dead letter’.36 Still other scholars argue that compliance is closely linked to 
the overall legal infrastructure capacity and government effectiveness. If the institutional 
capacity of the country is high (i.e. if there are several domestic bodies to check for 
compliance), this helps willing politicians implement judgments quickly and ‘the adverse 
judgments are unlikely to be obstructed or ignored, even when the government, political elites, 
or other actors are reluctant’.37 In this context, for example, the UK Joint Committee for Human 
Rights has been hailed as a key institution, holding a ‘powerful and central place in the UK’s 
parliamentary system of government’,38 and acting as ‘a conduit between the executive, 
legislature and judiciary on human rights concerns’ to expedite compliance with the ECHR by 
‘facilitating the involvement of civil society groups and the media in monitoring compliance 
and holding the state to account’.39  
Yet, as empirical studies have shown, compliance may not only be affected by variables 
related to the state but also by the type of remedies adopted by the Court in its judgments. 
Whilst low capacity countries may appear to take longer to implement, this may not be 
                                                 
32 Results of this research will be published in late 2018.  
33 Eric Neumayer, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’, 49(6) The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 925, 2005; Basak Cali and Alice Wyss, ‘Why do Democracies Comply with Human Rights 
Judgments? A Comparative Analysis of the UK, Ireland and Germany’, 2009, accessible on SSRN; Beth Ann 
Simmons and Allison Danner, ‘Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, 64(2) International 
Organization, 225, 2010. 
34 Beth Ann Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights International Law in Domestic Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, 2009. 
35 Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
36 Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib, Compliance in the Enlarged European Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters?, 
Routledge, 2008. 
37 Dia Anagnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Domestic Implementation of Human Rights Judgments in Europe: 
Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter’, 25(1) European Journal of International Law, 2014: 
205. 
38 ibid 222.  
39 C. Hillebrecht, ‘Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European 
Court of Human Rights’, 13 Human Rights Review (2012) 279, 293.  
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necessarily because they have less expertise or capacity but because often they also apparently 
attract judgments that are more difficult to implement.40 In this context, Yuval Shany argues 
that compliance ‘may be strongly influenced by the substantive positions endorsed by the 
judgment in question and the specific type of remedies issued.’ 41 He hypothesizes that the less 
objectionable the substantive portion of the court judgment is (for the losing party), and the 
less onerous the remedies issued, the greater the judgment’s ‘compliance pull’ is expected to 
be.42 Therefore, the more the state agrees with the substance of the judgment and the less effort 
is required of it to enforce the decision, the more likely the compliance. This basic insight on 
compliance is supported not only in the international legal realism literature, which often uses 
game theoretic models to illustrate the interplay between state interests and compliance;43 it 
also finds support in some initial, small-scale descriptive empirical work, which suggests that 
‘high-cost’ judgments (i.e. judgments the compliance with which adversely affects important 
state interests in a significant manner) are less complied with than ‘low-cost’ judgments.44 
Hawking and Jacoby, for example, found that in many ECtHR cases still pending before the 
Committee of Ministers, just satisfaction (as the low-cost element of the judgment) was paid 
quickly after the initial judgment was rendered, but any additional remedies – such as 
individual measures or general measures – were either not adopted or considerably delayed.45 
In the now infamous Iigar Mammadov v Azerbaijan case,46 the ECtHR awarded 20,000 Euros 
in damages to the victim, a fervent critic of the government who had been arrested and detained 
without any evidence of having committed the offence with which he was charged. The Court 
concluded that the actual purpose of his detention had been to silence or punish Mr Mammadov 
for criticising the Government and publishing information it was trying to hide. Without any 
delay, Azerbaijan paid Mammadov the damages in compliance with the judgment, yet today – 
even years after the judgment, the victim still remains in prison despite the condemnations 
received from the Committee of Ministers and calls for his release.  
The observation that states may be distinguishing between different remedies and 
choosing to comply with only the less onerous parts of the judgment is important since the aim 
of international courts is not only to trigger action in response to the judgment in relation to the 
individual appearing before the Court, but also to encourage more general convergence or 
internalization of norms,47 compelling states to make international norms part of their domestic 
legal system in such a manner as to make international supervision completely unnecessary. 
The expectation is therefore that international norms and decisions will get embedded into the 
                                                 
40 Sharanbir Grewal and Erik Voeten, ‘Are New Democracies Better Human Rights Compliers?’, 69(2) International 
Organization, 497, 2015. ‘Low capacity’ is used by the authors in the article.  
41 Yuval Shany, ‘Compliance with Decisions of International Courts as Indicative of Their Effectiveness: A Goal-
Based Analysis’, in James Crawford and Sarah Nouwen (eds) 3 Select Proceedings of the European Society of 
International Law 231, 2010, 232. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, Oxford University Press 2005: 154-155; 
Andrew T. Guzman, ‘A Compliance Based Theory of International Law’, 90(6) California Law Review, 1823, 
2002: 1846; Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Springer, 1995: 50; George W. Downs, David 
M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom, ‘Is the Good News about Cooperation?’, 50(3) International Organization, 379, 
1996: 379, 380-383.  
44 Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby, ‘Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American 
American Courts for Human Rights’, (2010) 6(1) Journal of International Law and International Relations, 35. 
45 ibid. 55ff. Similar state same behaviour was recorded in relation to judgments of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, where the Court’s awards of damages or instructions to states to apologize enjoyed greater 
compliance (42% and 31% respectively), whilst the requirement to punish perpetrators or amend, repeal or adopt 
domestic laws to internalize the judgment were met with the smallest compliance (2 instances only, ie 4% 
compliance). This amounts to 4% in comparison to the 42% in which compensation is paid. 
46 Iigar Mammadov v Azerbaijan, App no 15172/13 (ECtHR, 22 May 2014). 
47 Koh (n 9); Goodman and Jinks 2013 (n 8). 
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domestic laws and will change domestic practices to an extent that prevents violations from 
occurring and deters potential violators.48 In this context, however, an international court like 
the ECtHR together with the Committee of Ministers seeking to effectuate a change in laws 
and practices of its member states faces a dilemma. As the picture below shows, ‘[t]he less 
onerous the remedies issued by the international court are, the smaller is the potential change 
in state practice brought about by these remedies and thus the … more “shallow” is the court’s 
impact’.49 Although compliance with monetary remedies may therefore be high, the impact of 
a judgment in the state’s domestic legal system could be minimal. In fact, ‘judicial remedies 
may fail to impact state practice either because they are rejected by states as utopian – 
completely divorced from their interests, or apologetic – reflective of practices existing 
independently of the judgment – and therefore meaningless’.50  
 
Picture 1: The efficiency diagram 
Choosing a remedy requires the Court to reflect upon its institutional responsibility and 
limits of its competence. An essential part of that role appears to involve an assessment of 
which measure will be most efficient.51 In this regard, it has to strategically weigh which 
remedy is most likely to be implemented and which will have the deepest impact. The Court’s 
preference for damages is clearly visible from Picture 1, where the size of the circle indicates 
the number of cases in which compensation v other non-monetary remedies was awarded. The 
Court is, of course, aware of the dangers of imposing specific non-monetary remedies that no 
state complies with.52 On occasion, the judgments of the ECtHR contain some 
recommendations about the individual or general measures that ought to be adopted to fully 
enforce the judgment in the domestic legal system. In the first pilot judgment issued by the 
Court, Broniowski v Poland, the Court suggested ‘appropriate legal and administrative 
measures’ be taken to address ‘malfunctioning Polish legislation’ in relation to expropriation.53 
                                                 
48 Laurence Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’, European Journal of International Law, 19(1), 2008. 
49 Shany (n 43): 232. 
50 Shany (n 43): 232; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
51 In the interviews, judges admit that compliance is a necessary concern when choosing remedies. Judge 7, 
February 2018.  
52 Link between compliance and reputation: G. Parameswaran ‘Reputation, Compliance, and Judicial Decision 
Making’ at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/LET_2014_9.pdf; Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, "Reputation, 
Information and the Organization of the Judiciary" (2009) 4 Journal of Comparative Law 228.  
53 Broniowski v Poland App no 31443/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004); Sicilianos (n 16).  
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However, for the most part the Court insists that it is not its task to determine what non-
monetary remedies would appropriately satisfy the obligations under the Convention.54 The 
Court is concerned about over-reaching: on one side, specifying non-monetary remedies might 
interfere with the state’s domestic legal system (e.g. ‘[i]t is not for the Court to prescribe 
specific procedures for domestic courts to follow’),55 and on the other side, choosing the means 
by which the state should discharge its obligation under the Convention is to be determined 
mutually by the state and the Committee of Ministers.56 Yet, the Committee of Ministers rather 
than instructing governments on measures to be taken, equally waits for the state to present its 
own Action Plan in which it sets out the strategy for compliance and internalization. ‘Discretion 
therefore prevails even as innovation in legal rules and judicial practice have prompted the 
Court to partly diverge from it’.57 The current set up therefore provides states ample freedom 
to determine for themselves what the remedy should be. Once an adverse ruling is rendered, 
states must work backwards from the violation to understand what must be changed to remedy 
it in the specific case and to ensure future cases do not arise. 
Leaving such extensive discretion to states to determine their own remedies relies on 
the persuasive power of the Court’s ruling.58 International courts typically have very low 
enforcement authority and compliance with their decisions is always voluntary. In this regard, 
as Shany argues, it is the substance of the judgments and the positions endorsed that will be 
motivate and persuade states to implement changes.59 For example, some scholars argue that 
when the ECtHR found that the opinion of an advocate general could not be regarded as neutral 
under Article 6, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands were nudged into adopting 
extensive domestic judicial reforms in spite of the historical position of the advocate general 
in their respective systems. The judgments of the Court had painted a sufficiently persuasive 
picture of a need for a specific ‘judicial design’ within which the old role of advocate generals 
was simply no longer tenable and had to be revamped to make it consistent with the 
Convention.60 In this sense, leaving discretion to states on how to change the position of the 
advocate general motivated compliance because the legal systems were provided with 
sufficient ‘breathing room’ to come up with their own solution.61 Judicial silence and deference 
to state on how to enforce and internalize human rights decisions would therefore appear to 
open up a dialogue between the Court and State and overtime promote better compliance.  
Yet, the decision of the Court not to be prescriptive as far as individual and general 
measures are concerned may mean also that many states take their prerogative by designing 
remedies that take less than full account of the Court’s judgment.62 This point has long been 
acknowledged by Court insiders and on a number of occasions the Committee of Ministers has 
explicitly requested that the Court expressly stipulate the remedy.63 As Chayes and Chayes 
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argue, in international law ‘ambiguity and indeterminacy’ of legal language ‘lie at the root of 
much of the behaviour that may seem to violate treaty requirements’.64 Extensive 
noncompliance may stem from imprecision in how obligations are framed. If the ECtHR does 
not specify actions or remedies required, it is difficult for states to comply and internalize its 
judgments. If its judgments are meant to persuade states and cajole them into a certain 
behaviour, then they are most useful ‘if they sharply reduce uncertainty about the content of 
obligations’.65 In this context, compliance and internalization will occur only after states have 
engaged in an active assessment of the justification for these norms and understood their 
content. Precision therefore promotes compliance and internalization. To a certain extent, this 
has been shown in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights context, which provides a list 
of highly specific steps that must be undertaken as remedies to adverse judgments. This 
checklist often leads to only partial compliance,66 but the specificity nevertheless helps states 
with enforcement.  
The ECtHR is increasingly ‘quite concerned with states’ inclination and capacity to 
abide by Court decisions and is now devoting significant resources to ‘helping states’.67 In this 
context, the Court has agreed in some cases to assist the respondent State by attempting to 
indicate the type of measures it could take in order to put an end to the systemic situation found 
in the case. This has occurred especially in cases where the Court wished to ‘facilitate the rapid 
and effective suppression of a malfunction found in the national system of human rights 
protection’,68 such as reinstating a judge to the Supreme Court,69 reducing a prisoner’s 
sentence,70 or even putting in place a mechanism for enforcement of domestic judgments.71 
These have shown varying results. Whilst judge Volkov was reinstated back to his position as 
Supreme Court justice on the instructions of the Court in 2015 and Scoppola’s sentence was 
reduced,72 the pilot decision relating to Ukraine’s non-enforcement of thousands of domestic 
judgments remains unimplemented.73 In fact, by 2017 the situation in relation to Ukraine had 
become so frustrating that the Court admitted that its practice was ‘incapable of achieving its 
intended purpose’ and that it had come time for the Court to ‘redefine … its role’.74 Referring 
to the Brighton Declaration, the Court asserted that it only had a ‘subsidiary’ role to play in the 
context of execution of its judgments and that it had discharged it fully by specifying the 
appropriate remedy in the previous (pilot) decision.75 The Court proceeded to dismiss more 
than 12,000 cases against the state, insisting that when general remedial measures were 
ineffective, it was for the Committee of Ministers and the Execution Department together with 
State Parties to seek out new measures to motivate state compliance.76 Since the State could 
not be persuaded to address the violation domestically, the Court therefore gave up.  
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3. When Monetary Remedies Can Provide an Incentive  
As shown above, non-monetary remedies – individual and general – often remain unenforced 
and the ECtHR generally avoids imposing these remedies out of respect for states’ discretion 
in the implementation of its judgments77 or due to concerns about non-compliance.78 Instead, 
the Court’s focus is on Article 41 – just satisfaction. The ECtHR awards damages (‘just 
satisfaction’) for violation of rights contained in the Convention. Regardless of the type of the 
violations, damages are the primary, go-to remedy used by the ECtHR. The Court insists that 
‘the awarding of sums of money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the 
Court's main duties but is incidental to its task of ensuring the observance by States of their 
obligations under the Convention.’79 In this context, the Court ‘does not provide a mechanism 
for compensation in a manner comparable to domestic court systems’.80 Instead, the aim of 
awarding compensation is to ‘provide reparation solely for damage suffered by those concerned 
to the extent that such events constitute a consequence of the violation that cannot otherwise 
be remedied.’81  
The aim of ‘just satisfaction’ is to compensate the victim for their ‘loss’, to address the 
wrong done to them and to correct the injustice.82 In this context, the expectation is that the 
Court will adjust the amount of compensation ‘to the concrete situation of each’ victim83 and 
to their personal circumstances.84 But the current practice of the Court provides no clear 
principles as to when damages should be awarded and how they should be measured. Although 
the Convention uses the term ‘just satisfaction’ to refer to monetary damages, it is unclear how 
the Court determines what is ‘just’. Already in 2001, the Law Commission – the law reform 
body for England and Wales – criticized the approach of the Court as arbitrary and lacking in 
transparency.85 Instead of adopting a clear approach, the amount of the award is determined on 
a case-by-case basis, ‘often without considering or distinguishing cases involving similar 
facts’.86 Practitioners and judges complain that to this day this lack of reasoned decisions 
articulating principles on which a remedy is afforded makes their work difficult.87 It provides 
little opportunity to victims of rights violations for vindication of their interests or to 
governments that wish to redress such breaches.  
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It is in the context of this reliance on Article 41 and the lack of transparency about what 
is happening that claims about a shift in approach of the Court have become more relevant. In 
a recent article, a current sitting judge of the Court, Pinto de Albuquerque has argued that the 
Court ‘uses punitive damages implicitly’ and advocated that it ‘should’ do so even more 
frequently in the future in order to prevent repetition of wrongful conduct by states.88 Because 
little is known about the Court’s approach to damages,89 Pinto’s argument that punitive 
damages are being implicitly used by the Court has to be taken seriously. Given the secrecy 
revolving the Court’s approach to Article 41, it is entirely possible that the Court has ‘covertly’ 
adopted a punitive rather than a compensatory approach to damages. The claim is of course of 
even greater relevance because it is made by a judge currently sitting in the Court, someone 
who has an insight into the work of the institution but also the power to influence its approach.90  
The argument in favour of punitive damages rather than non-monetary remedies 
appears appealing at first sight. Monetary remedies appear less onerous and less interventionist 
– they do not tell the state how to behave or what measure to adopt,91 they merely say how 
much the breach will cost. In addition, empirical studies suggest that they are complied with 
more frequently, on average 2 or 3 times more often than other remedies.92 But although this 
holds for regular compensatory awards, it is unclear to what extent this is true of punitive 
damages. ‘An award of punitive or exemplary damages makes the admonitory function of 
reparation more important and express than it would be if money judgments were limited to 
compensatory damages.’93 When a judgment condemns wrongful conduct and accords 
remedies to the injured, this is ‘assumed to discourage repetition of the act as well as to warn 
others who might be similarly inclined.’94 In many circumstances, punitive damages ‘contain 
elements of compensation as well as deterrence and punishment.’95 Shelton, for example cites 
cases in which the monetary damages awarded go beyond the actual harm suffered by the 
plaintiff (e.g. a serious wrong that happens to cause small pecuniary loss) and would go under-
deterred if damages were only measured at the level of a compensatory award.  
The argument that punitive damages may be efficient in changing state behaviour stems 
from research undertaken in two areas: economic analysis of the law and behavioural 
economics. The first assumes that if states behave as rational actors, then they will pursue their 
goals rationally. This means that if external constraints are imposed on state behaviour, states 
will adjust accordingly. In this context, damages can act as an incentive for states not to engage 
in human rights violations. ‘The threat of being held liable induces the state to incorporate the 
losses for the victims into their decisions on whether and how to engage in certain activities.’96 
The state effectively performs a cost-benefit analysis, deciding to cease its behaviour because 
to continue it would be too costly. Yet, this line of reasoning requires that the damages imposed 
are high enough for the state to internalize the required behaviour.  
 But the practice of attaching a ‘price’ to a human right violation can be problematic 
since it may have an unexpected, negative effect on violators. Behavioural economists who 
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have shown that people have cognitive biases and only bounded willpower,97 note that when a 
‘fine’ is attached to violations, rational actors may perceive this as a way of paying off their 
wrongdoing. In principle, a fine should reduce infractions. Empirical evidence, however, 
suggests that a fine ‘releases the actors from concerns about social disapproval’ or ‘social 
discomfort’ they may have felt in violating a norm.98 In effect, a fine changes the actors’ 
perception of the nature of the obligation.99 In a famous experiment, Gneezy and Rustichini 
have shown that parents who are late to pick up their children from kindergarten feel guilty 
about being so. But when a fine is attached to their lateness, the guilt factor is removed and 
parents are increasingly likely to be even more tardy to pick up their children. The introduction 
of the fine ‘not only reduces the disapproval for being late but parents also no longer consider 
being late as blame-worthy.’ Even more, ‘the imposition of a price conveys the message that 
the commodity of “being late” could now be bought’.100  
If we translate this into the human rights context, the action of monetising a violation 
can give ‘potential norm violators the opportunity to free themselves from following a social 
norm by making them pay for the norm violation’.101 By paying for the violation, states are 
released from the discomfort or disapproval that their initial behaviour generates. If the same 
violation repeatedly leads to the same price (as legal certainty and principle of equity may 
require), this perception may be reinforced. In this regard, the process of assigning a price to 
rights leads to states being enabled to effectively buy their wrongdoing.102 In effect therefore, 
a state may be ‘willing to violate a social norm by purchasing the prerogative to do so’.103 
If damages are to act as an incentive to states to change their behaviour, they therefore 
have to take into account both the rational and irrational aspects of state behaviour. Whilst the 
economic analysis of law ‘has traced the incentive effects of punitive damages on potential 
wrongdoers based on the assumption that they pursue their material advantage’,104 behavioural 
economists focus on how actors react in practice. In this context, for example, Eisenberg and 
Engel have shown that depending on the amount of damages, actors may be deterred the more 
uncertain the threat of the sanction and the higher its severity if they were sanctioned in the 
past.105 It is not enough to impose high damages, expecting that states will undertake a 
straightforward cost-benefit analysis. Rather, both the uncertainty and the harshness of 
damages appear to be at play, as well as players’ previous experiences. Behavioural economists 
also consider how norms are expressed. As Cooter argues, punitive rather than aggravated 
damages are successful because they ‘allow[] judges … to express righteous anger through 
speech and punishment. Expression of emotions by the court demonstrates the strength of its 
commitment to the law in question. Perception of this commitment shapes the expectations of 
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citizens [e.g. states] and changes their behaviour.’106 The expressive power of adjudication is 
therefore also crucial.107 In their judgments, courts provide clear signals to the violator state 
that they disapprove of its behaviour. Whilst in theory, it is argued that ‘adjudicative expression 
can, by itself, influence the behaviour of existing disputants and of future potential 
disputants,’108 empirical experiments show that when a fine is framed retributively (as a 
punishment) and publicly, it will act as a more effective deterrent.109 When the damage 
amounts are interpreted as a ‘punishment’ or ‘sanction’, states are less likely to transgress the 
rules. Because punishment is expressed publicly, the additional publicity element adds a clear 
message to participants and to observers about what type of behaviour is undesired or immoral. 
The ‘threat of a more publicly extracted fine might act as a more powerful incentive for 
cooperative behavior.’110 
If – as some judges at the Court argue – damages should seek to incentivize states to 
change their behaviour and thus serve the purpose of deterrence, the question is whether the 
Court has already adopted this approach and whether Article 41 is currently being used as a 
potential deterrent. ‘Whenever a purpose of a norm is stated, a need for a social analysis arises 
in order to verify whether the purpose will be fulfilled in reality.’111 Joining together the lessons 
from economic analysis of law and behavioural economists, there are three elements that a 
damage award would have to fulfil to have a deterrent effect: (1) high value, (2) 
unpredictability, (3) and it would have to be framed retributively. Building on empirical 
research, the next three sections address each in turn. They reveal not only that the current 
ECHR practice is lacking in all three respects, but also the obstacles that may prevent the 
adoption of punitive damages in the future. 
4. An Economic and Behavioural Analysis of ECHR’s Current 
Approach to Damages  
A. Transparency, Elevated Value and Individualization  
From the perspective of the economic analysis of law, damages may be seen as an instrument 
that can provide behavioural incentives to states to change their actions. The threat of being 
held liable induces actors (states) to incorporate potential losses into their decision-making and 
to reassess how often they should engage in such activity and what measures they should take 
to prevent such events in the future. Taking more care, putting measures into place to prevent 
violations, can lower probability of future violations and thus – in the long term – significantly 
reduce the actors’ losses. Yet, such cost-benefit analysis works only if the costs of paying-off 
continuing, repetitive breaches are so high that (at least in the long-term) they outweigh the 
costs of putting in place preventative measures. Damages should therefore ‘be high enough to 
make taking due care [i.e. putting in place preventative measures] … more attractive than 
applying a lower care level.’112 In effect, the economic line of reasoning implies that damages 
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should be high enough for the violator to consider seriously whether a different, non-violative 
behaviour would not be more cost-effective.  
The ECtHR’s approach to setting damages, especially non-pecuniary damage takes a 
different approach. As English courts have found, compensation at the ECtHR is ‘ungenerous’ 
in comparison to English tort standards,113 and in general the amounts are exceedingly low and 
often merely ‘symbolic’.114 Even in the most serious cases, the awards tend to be modest, e.g. 
20,000 Euros for torture, about 50,000 for disappearance of a loved one.115 The graphs below 
contain all of the non-pecuniary awards made in the last 13 years for violations of Article 3 
(torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 5 (arbitrary detention).116 They clearly 
show that the amounts of damages are low: 74.5 percent of all Article 3 applicants are awarded 
compensation below 10,000 Euros, and in 94.8% of victims, the amount is below 20,000. In 
Article 5, 80.7% of victims receive below 5000 and 94.8% below 10,000.  
 
Picture 2: Just satisfaction for torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and detention 
These considerably ‘ungenerous’ amounts are problematic from two perspectives. In 
the context of determining the appropriate amount, economists underline that a court needs to 
take into account the probability that a violator will be held liable. Victims of human rights 
violations face numerous obstacles before they get to the ECtHR. They have to exhaust all 
domestic remedies; if their case is declared admissible, they have to show that it was the state 
who committed the violation through active or passive behaviour;117 after which they have to 
wait numerous years before their case is heard and before the judgment is rendered, all without 
certainty that their case will be successful.118 Victims may find it too expensive to bring a suit 
and pursue the violator through the different stages of the process, especially when comparing 
the costs to the expected outcome of the process. They may thus suffer from what is known as 
‘rational apathy’.119 At the same time, the violating state may choose to offer settlement money 
to the victim in order to prevent the case from coming to the Court or afterward, to prevent the 
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final judgment from being rendered.120 All of these elements contribute to the fact, that a 
finding of violation before any court, including the ECtHR, is uncertain. The violator takes this 
into account and may be willing to ‘gamble’ that due to any of these obstacles the finding of a 
violation is unlikely. High damages can ameliorate this situation.121 They may provide ‘an 
incentive to victims who have suffered severe dignitary harm’ to pursue wrongdoers regardless 
of how difficult the path may be.122 The more uncertain the outcome, the higher the damages 
have to be if the victim is to be sufficiently motivated and potential wrongdoers dissuaded from 
emulating wrongful conduct. ‘The factor with which compensatory damages should be 
multiplied, is reciprocal of the probability of being held liable.’123 Therefore, if the probability 
of a finding of a violation is 50%, then damages ‘have to be doubled to provide the correct 
incentives’.124  
But the low-level awards made by the Court do not take into account the tough route 
the applicant faces in getting to a violation. This allows states to be more willing to risk being 
taken to the Court, especially when there is a specific social benefit (or utility) to breaching the 
Convention. The case of Ilgar Mammadov can serve as an example. An opposition politician 
in Azerbaijan, who was considered a likely candidate for the presidential elections of 
Azerbaijan in 2013, was arrested, put on trial and sentenced in a move ‘widely seen as 
politically motivated’.125 Although the ECtHR had found a violation of Articles 5, 6, and 18 of 
the Convention and awarded 20,000 Euros in compensation, which was promptly paid, 
Mammadov remains in prison. The just satisfaction award – which, it should be noted was set 
at the very high end for Article 5 violations,126 therefore had no deterrent effect and the 
imprisonment of Mammadov clearly has greater utility to Azerbaijan than the damages 
awarded. Economists argue, therefore that damages ‘should be so high that they deter even the 
[violator] who [enjoys] these unaccepted benefits.’127  
The ‘ungenerous’ amounts awarded are problematic also from the perspective of how 
they assess the victim’s suffering. A part of using damages as a deterrent requires also that the 
Court estimates properly how much the victim has suffered. ‘If there is a risk that compensatory 
damages fall short of the true losses of the victim, the [violator] does not receive adequate 
behavioural incentives.’128 In order to motivate the violator to change their behaviour, the 
awards therefore have to focus on the victim and the loss or harm suffered. Yet, judges at the 
Court openly admit they struggle with assessing victim’s suffering, especially in the context of 
non-pecuniary damages. On numerous occasions they ‘acknowledge that it may generally be 
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questionable whether human-rights violations can be cured by money’ and that it is difficult or 
impossible ‘to express in monetary terms the pain of having lost [a] son.’129 In interviews, they 
acknowledge they have no expertise in this respect and argue that they find it easier to assess 
the harm with reference to quantifiable elements (especially duration of a violation), which 
allow for comparisons between cases.130 In this context, empirical results show that variables 
such as victim’s assessment of loss, their particular circumstances or vulnerability, and distress 
suffered, appear to not have a bearing on the final award. 131 
Instead, statistical analysis has shown that it is the respondent state (and variables 
connected to it) that has a significant influence on the awards made by the Court. Damages 
appear to correlate better with the respondent state and its level of economic development.132 
The Court argues that by adjusting damages to the state, it is seeking to ensure that victims 
have equal purchasing power,133 but the almost exclusive focus on the state uncovered in 
empirical studies goes beyond that. My results reveal that the state’s previous infringement 
record also plays a role. In relation to some violations, there seems to be a reduction of 
compensation from case to case for the same type of behaviour.134 As other scholars have noted, 
in multiple applicant cases, compensation to each victim is lower than if they appeared in a 
single-applicant claim.135 These results would suggest that the more a state violates a certain 
right, the less it pays for that breach. When asked about this trend of award decreases, judges 
admit that the results may be due to compliance worries that they grapple with in their decision-
making.136 When states invoke the economic crisis as affecting their ability to pay, this is taken 
into account in the Court’s approach to cases.137 Judges also admit, for example, that Ukraine’s 
claims about limited resources (due to a war it is fighting in the west), may have been taken 
into account in the imposition of lower awards made by the Court.138 In a series of cases relating 
to the non-enforcement of the decisions of Ukrainian courts, the compensation for individuals 
waiting for enforcement was decreased from initial 5000 Euros for non-pecuniary damage (in 
1999) to 2500 Euros in Ivanov pilot decision (in 2008) and then to 2000 Euros in Pysarskyy (in 
2013). Although initially, the Court drew careful distinctions between victims waiting for 
enforcement below and above three years (1500 and 3000 Euros respectively),139 gradually the 
distinction was removed and since 2013 the applicants were paid 2000 Euros regardless of the 
amount of time they waited for the enforcement of decisions, with some waiting longer than 
                                                 
129 Nagmetov v Russia App No 35589/08 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 30 March 2017, concurring opinion of Judges 
Nussberger and Lemmens, para 5. 
130 Interview with Judge 3, February 2018.  
131 For example, there is no correlation between amount claimed and award provided. See author’s forthcoming 
article 2018. 
132 Apicella v Italy App no. 64890/ 01 (ECtHR, 10 November 2004), para. 26. 47. See author’s forthcoming article 
2018, which reveals that the state and the state’s systemic violation count provides a considerably better fit than 
victim variables.  
133 Ichim (n 89) 47.  
134 For example, in the context of Article 3, where we could expect a punitive approach, states pay only a few 
Euros more for each additional case in which a violation of Article 3 is found against them. Initial results for 
Article 5 are even more interesting and suggest a decrease in compensation to victim of 88 Euros per each 
additional case against the state. See author’s forthcoming article.  
135 David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Colin Warbrick, The Law Of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
OUP (3rd, 2014) 156.   
136 Interviews with Judge 7 and 8, February 2018. See also explanation in Arvanitaki v Greece, app. no 27278/03, 
(ECtHR, 15 Feburary 2008 (GC)), underlying that group cases are different.  
137 Fr. Tulkens, “La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et la crise économique. La question de la 
pauvreté” (“The European Convention on Human Rights and the economic crisis. The issue of poverty”), Journal 
européen des droits de l’homme / European Journal of Human Rights, 2013/1, pp. 8 et seq. 
138 Interview with Judge 7, also underlying that the aim is to get the victims at least ‘something’.  
139 Kharuk and Others v. Ukraine, App No 703/05 (ECtHR [Committee] 26 July 2012). 
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ten years.140 Even more, the awards which were initially made only for non-pecuniary damage, 
were now intended to cover both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage regardless of the 
financial loss suffered by the applicant.  
The story does not end there. In 2015, and in light of the thousands(!) of outstanding 
cases before the Court on non-enforcement of decisions, the Court accepted that the Ukrainian 
Government could avoid further claims, by paying applicants only 1000 Euros for non-
pecuniary damage, together with an undertaking to enforce the domestic judgments.141 From 
1999 to 2015, the ‘price’ for non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions had therefore 
fallen from 5000 Euros to 20% of this. Even after Ukraine’s promises to the victims to pay 
them the reduced amounts and enforce the outstanding judgments, applicants complained that 
their promises went unfulfilled.142 In spite of reducing the financial burden on Ukraine, the 
original structural problem remained unaddressed.  
Such judgments speak of the concern on the part of the Court about the ability and 
willingness of the state to comply with its decisions.143 But from an economic analysis 
perspective, the approach of the Court is completely counter-intuitive since one would expect 
recalcitrant behaviour to get more and more expensive. Instead, the Court’s approach makes 
violations cheaper and turns the cost-benefit analysis upside-down. Even more, from a 
behavioural economic viewpoint it reinforces the idea that the award is a ‘price’ for recalcitrant 
behaviour and provides little or no encouragement for states to change their behaviour. States 
pay for the delay but then continue their actions without making any changes. The 29,000 
Ivanov-type cases, which the Court has received between 1999 to 2017 reveal how the 
remedies adopted by the Court have failed to incentivize Ukraine to change its behaviour. In 
fact, by overwhelming the Court with cases generated by unaddressed structural problems, 
Ukraine appears to have managed to get a ‘discount on quantity’ for its behaviour. This 
decision to adjust or effectively lower damages to facilitate states’ compliance has had no 
deterrent effect and instead could lead to the potential collapse of the system. In 2017, in 
Burmych v Ukraine, when the issue of Ivanov-type cases arose again before the Court, the 
Grand Chamber effectively gave up on trying to incentivize Ukraine to comply with its 
judgments. The Court dismissed all of its remaining 12,148 Ivanov-type cases as well as any 
future cases144 and forwarded them to the Department of Execution at the Council of Europe. 
The Court’s argument was that it had done everything it could, now it was for the Department 
of Execution to find a solution to implementation of its judgments.145  
                                                 
140 Pysarskyy and Others v. Ukraine App No no. 20397/07 (ECtHR [Committee], 20 June 2013). 
141 Samoylenko and 4,999 Others v Ukraine, App Nos. 11212/08 - 2803/15, 20 January 2015, through the means 
of unilateral declarations; Burmych and others v Ukraine (n 76): paras 40 and 41. 
142 Burmych and others v Ukraine (n 76): para 42; dissenting opinion argues that no compensation had been paid 
to any of the applicants, para 9.  
143 This approach is of course not limited to Ukraine. Especially in pilot judgments, countries may be given a 
‘discount’ to enable them to redress the violation at home. In this regard, the Pinto legislation in Italy, which is 
intended to enable victims of lengthy proceedings to claim their remedy before Italian courts, accords victims 
only 45% of what they would get at the ECHR level. Instead of 1500 Euros per year of delay, the awards imposed 
are closer to 700 Euros per year. This ‘discount’ allows Italy to deal with thousands of victims whilst closing off 
further recourse to the Strasbourg Court. Stornaiuolo c. Italia, Application No. 52980/99, (ECtHR, 8 August 2006, 
para 94); Delle Cave e Corrado c. Italia, App. no. 32850/02, (ECtHR, 16 July 2013). Such measures also address 
concerns about the Court being overburdened with repetitive cases.  
144 Burmych and others v Ukraine (n 76): See dissenting opinion of Judges Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakas, De 
Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc on pro futuro aspect of the judgment, para 6.  
145 This conclusion was challenged by very strong dissents. The approach adopted by the Court was in danger of 
‘transferring the determination of human rights claims from a judicial authority, as the Convention system 
requires, to a political body, albeit a collective one, namely the Committee of Ministers.’ But more than this: it 
was accused of giving the violator Governments the power ‘to seize control of thousands of cases brought against 
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The first requirement of damages as a deterrent requires awards to be individualized, 
so that the victim’s loss and suffering is recognized and that the low probability of being 
successful before the Court is acknowledged. Yet, the ECtHR does not focus on the victim, but 
on the state and its capacity to comply with the decision. As the dissenters in Burmych put it, 
the majority’s decision to join all 12,148 applications without ‘assess[ing] each of the cases 
individually’ contradicts the idea of the Convention system as one of ‘individual justice’.146 
Under the Convention, each victim has the right to have their case decided after an individual 
judicial consideration of their single application and a thorough examination of their case file. 
Yet, the Court circumvents this fact. Although the approach of the Court in Burmych appears 
counter-intuitive from an economic analysis of the law perspective, the reduction of fines from 
case-to-case is perhaps not in itself surprising. Psychologists show that our reactions to large 
number of cases (e.g. large losses of human life, large scale atrocities or violations) are different 
than when we are dealing with a single case. Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton and 
Sherman find that ‘a single individual, unlike a group, is viewed as a psychologically coherent 
unit. This leads to more extensive processing of information and stronger impressions about 
individuals than about groups.’147 People feel more distress and compassion when ‘considering 
an identified single victim than when considering a group of victims.’148 There is a novelty and 
immediacy with one single victim.149 When ‘a violation becomes a statistic (as it necessarily 
does when you are dealing with 29,000 similar cases on non-enforcement of domestic 
judgments), this leads to psychological numbing: ‘repetition eventually numbs the moral 
imagination’.150 Charities receive less donations for two starving children rather than one and 
even less when the problem is introduced in statistical terms.151 People are less willing to help 
unidentified statistical victims than identified individuals.152 In essence, the bigger the 
numbers, the more our view of and consideration for each individual victim is blurred.153 When 
people in the cases dealt by the Court become unidentified statistical victims, then this ‘leads 
to apathy and inaction’.154 The first problem of the Court’s approach is therefore uncovered.  
                                                 
them before the Court and the entire philosophy of the Convention judicial supervision system [was] distorted.’ 
Burmych and others v Ukraine (n 76), Dissenting opinion of Judges Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakas, De 
Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc, Paras 13 and 19. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Paul Slovic and David Zionits ‘Can international law stop genocide when out moral intuitions fail us?’ in Ryan 
Goodman, Derek Jinks and Andrew Woods (eds) Understanding Social Action, Promoting Human Rights (2012) 
100, 115.  
148 Tehila Kogut, IlanaRitov, ‘The “identified victim” effect: an identified group, or just a single individual?’, 
(2005) 18(3) Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 157.  
149 See dissenting opinion of Helen Keller in Navalnyy v Russia, in which she disputes the award of damages in 
comparison to prior similar cases: ‘although Mr Navalnyy’s rights were violated in the context of seven different 
arrests, he was awarded just twice the amount of compensation awarded to an applicant whose rights were violated 
on only one occasion, as shown by the example of the Frumkin case. In effect, each of Mr Navalnyy’s arrests was 
compensated for by less than a third of the amount by way of just satisfaction that Mr Frumkin received for the 
violations of his rights suffered in conjunction with his arrest. While the awards made under Article 41 depend on 
a number of factors, and no two cases are identical in this or other regards, this is a glaring difference that 
accordingly demands an explanation. The question here, then, is whether it is justified to reduce the amount of 
compensation awarded to Mr Navalnyy for the individual violations of his rights in the light of the fact that they 
occurred on multiple occasions.’ Navalnyy v Russia, nos. 29580/12, (ECtHR, 2 February 2017), Emphasis added. 
150 Richard Just, ‘The Truth Will Not Set You Free: Everything We Know About Darfur, and Everything We’re 
not Doing About it.’ The New Republic, August 27, 2008, xx.  
151 Daniel Västfjäll, Paul Slovic, Marcus Mayorga, Ellen Peters, ‘Compassion Fade: Affect and Charity Are 
Greatest for a Single Child in Need ‘, PLOS ONE 9(6), 2014. 
152 Kogut and Ritov 2005 (n 146); Deborah Small, George Loewenstein, ‘Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: 
Altruism and Identifiability’, The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26:1; 5–16, 2003.  
153 Slovic and Zionts in Goodman (n 145), 117.  
154 Ibid.  
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B. Predictability of the amount of damages 
Behavioural economists have found that unpredictable damages have a better deterrent effect 
than fully predicable (or certain) damages. Looking at the issue both from a criminal law (in 
relation to sentencing) and tort law perspective (in relation to damages), these economists have 
experimented with uncertainty/certainty of sanctions and showed that a lack of predictability 
adds to the efficiency of legal norms. Using insights from behavioural economics and a simple 
experiment, Baker, Harel and Kugler found that when individuals are told with certainty what 
their sanction will be (or how much they will be charged for a specific breach), the deterrence 
effect of the primary norm was reduced. 155 Over the course of the experiment the value of the 
sanction was varied and participants had to decide at each point whether to breach the norm or 
obey it. The authors found that the greater the uncertainty regarding the size of the fine, the 
more unlikely the participants were to breach the norm and thus trigger the sanction. The 
conclusions drawn from this experiment were that, at least in the context of tort law,156 such 
results suggest that reform efforts aimed at making non-economic and punitive damages more 
predictable may decrease the deterrent effect of the law. The paper, which was written at a time 
when tort reform was discussed in the US, ended up rejecting the proposals that one should 
impose an upper limit on tort damages and thus make damages more certain. Reduction in 
uncertainty resulting from such reform could ‘well magnify the expected loss in deterrence.’157 
The conclusion was therefore that a lack of predictability seems to be a key ingredient of an 
efficient remedy network.  
The current practice of the ECtHR in relation to the imposition of damages is secret. 
There appear to be no clear principles as to when damages should be awarded and how they 
should be measured. Yet, in determining the quantum of non-pecuniary damages, the Court 
has established a set of internal ‘scales on equitable principles … in order to arrive at equivalent 
results in similar cases.’158 These were developed ‘after years of examining’ the reasons for the 
delays attributable to the parties under the Italian procedural rules, leading to the violation of 
Article 6, length of proceedings. The scales exist mostly for ‘repetitive’ or ‘clone’ cases, or 
indeed for ‘pilot-judgments’ and remain unpublished.159 Some authors argue that this lack of 
transparency is due to the Court being concerned about creating more litigation, but judges 
themselves admit that the lack of clarity preserves their discretion in the context of Article 
41.160  
At first sight, therefore, damages before the ECtHR appear to be uncertain. Yet, the 
data of the empirical analysis reveals a completely different picture. The graphs above show 
clearly that there is very little variation in amounts. 74.5% of all Article 3 applicants are 
awarded compensation below 10,000 Euros, and in 94.8% of victims, the amount is below 
20,000. In Article 5, 80.7% of victims receive below 5000 and 94.8% below 10,000 Euros. The 
consistency of the Court’s approach is such that out of 1128 applicants whose Article 3 rights 
were found to have been violated in the last 13 years, only one stands out as a clear outlier: a 
case of multiple occasions of torture, which exceptionally brought the victim 105,000 Euros. 
                                                 
155 Baker, Tom; Harel, Alon; and Kugler, Tamar, "The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental 
Approach" (2004) 89 Iowa Law Review 443. 
156 In criminal law such efficiency arguments arguably have to take second place to human rights concerns and 
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157 Baker 2004 (n 153): 477. 
158 Cocchiarella v Italy (Application no. 64886/01), (ECtHR 9 March 2006), not yet reported, at [67]. This has 
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the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights (December 2005) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ 2005LordWoolfworkingmethodsENG.pdf> accessed 29 September 2014. 
160 Interview with Judge 10.  
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Even if the Court enjoys discretion when it comes to the award of damages, it seems that it is 
choosing to exercise it in a consistent, predictable manner.  
In fact, judges acknowledge that those states who appear frequently before the Court 
(e.g. systemic violations) may have seen the tables and might even know precisely the spectrum 
within which the Court is almost certainly going to set the damage amounts.161 Those who have 
worked at the Court speak about the need for transparency and standardization – an objective 
basis on which calculation of damages takes place.162 Yet, in the absence of a general overview 
of the case law and an internal statistical analysis, they fail to see how intuitive the damage 
amounts are. In fact, the approach of the Court to calculating damages is so consistent, that 
judges take into account years or days of imprisonment (eg under Article 5), rather than 
consider whether an individual was especially vulnerable.163 This need to resort to only 
objective, quantifiable factors in determining damages means that more often than not the 
frequent violators are well aware of the ‘price’ their violation will trigger, even if the precise 
manner in which the amount will be calculated remains unknown.164  
What states know about the amount of damages as well as their previous experience 
before the Court are important, because it is not the theoretical threat of damages but states’ 
actual (prior) individual experience with sanctioning that affects their future behaviour.165 
Since the current approach of the Court provides for low and predictable damage amounts, 
states are enabled to plan the cost of their violations. An intriguing example of such behaviour 
is Russia, which is one of the worst systemic violators of the Convention (together with Turkey, 
Romania and Ukraine). Russian legislation explicitly requires that the annual budget of the 
country contains a part intended to pay off ECHR violations.166 From 2010 to 2016, the amount 
‘reserved’ for ECHR compensation has increased from 114 million rubles (1.7 million USD) 
to 500 million Rubles (7.6 million USD).167 At the same time, however, little has been achieved 
to address the source or underlying causes of these violations (especially the conduct of 
domestic authorities in the context of Articles 2 and 3). Although budgeting for ECHR 
compensation does not necessarily mean that Russia ‘plans’ its violations in advance, this 
clearly indicates some sort of calculation as to how much ECtHR violations will cost in a given 
year. Russia may be aware of the cases which are coming through the pipeline of the Court, 
yet rather than invest money into addressing systemic problems and breaches (or providing 
alternative remedies at home like Italy),168 Russia instead puts money towards compensating 
human rights violations. It seems therefore that the predictability of the ECtHR damages 
                                                 
161 Interview with Judge 10, February 2018; also dissent in Burmych acknowledges that the Court ‘usually 
discusses matters of judicial policy with different stakeholders in order to find optimum acceptable solutions’, (n 
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162 Ichim (n 89) 260.  
163 Celik and Yildiz v Turkey, app. no. 51479/99, (ECtHR, 10 November 2005), concurring opinion of Judge 
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appears to allow frequent violators to plan the cost of their violations, whilst doing little to 
address the underlying problems in their legal system.  
The Court asserts that its awards seek to work as ‘a serious and effective means of 
dissuasion’ especially in relation to systemic and repetitive violators.169 Yet, the Russian 
example clearly indicates that the current approach of the Court may be allowing (or enabling) 
states to think of compensation as a ‘price’ to be paid for a violation, whilst at the same time 
failing to act as an incentive for states to change their behaviour. The current operation of 
damages under the ECHR therefore appears to have no deterrent impact on the behaviour of 
states.  
C. Retribution and publicity as an essential element of punitive damages 
The third element that is necessary for damages to have a deterrent effect is that they be framed 
retributively and publicly. In this context, experiments have shown that if the financial amount 
is presented as a punishment, the threat of such retributive sanction is likely to produce the 
desired effect on behaviour.170 In contrast, when the amounts are interpreted as performing a 
compensatory function (i.e. when they are labelled as compensation for loss or harm), these 
are likely to be seen as an opportunity to compensate the victims of violative behaviour and 
have been shown to be ineffectual deterrents. It is the expressive function of labelling a fine as 
a ‘punishment’ or ‘sanction’ that means that individuals are less likely to transgress the rules. 
In experiments conducted, individuals were less likely to be late when a ‘punishment’ attached 
to their behaviour.  
Studies have also found greater behavioural effect of fines when these were extracted 
publicly (or threatened to be extracted publicly).171 The publicity element contains a clear 
message to participants and to observers about what type of behaviour is undesired or immoral. 
In experiments, when punishment was threatened to be imposed publicly, individuals showed 
up considerably earlier for the meeting than control groups. Thus, ‘it would appear that the 
threat of a more publicly extracted fine might act as a more powerful incentive for cooperative 
behavior.’172 It is the cumulative effect of both variables – framing the fine retributively and 
extracting/imposing it publicly – that has the most efficient impact on participants.173 
Therefore, in addition to the high value and unpredictability of damage amounts, it is crucial 
that the fine is framed as a sanction and that it is administered publicly. 
The ECtHR explicitly rejects the position that the damages are (or should be) punitive.  
The Practice Directives of March 2007 and January 2016 state that  
the purpose of the Court’s award in respect of damage is to compensate the applicant for the 
actual harmful consequences of a violation. It is not intended to punish the Contracting Party 
responsible. The Court has therefore, until now, considered it inappropriate to accept claims 
for damages with labels such as “punitive”, “aggravated” or “exemplary”.174 
The Practice Directives therefore clearly state that the Court has ‘until now’ not deviated from 
general international law, where punitive damages have been explicitly rejected.175 In case after 
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171 Ibid. 
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case, the Court has consistently and explicitly refused claimants’ requests for exemplary, 
aggravated or punitive damages, 176 including when such requests were specifically made to 
‘reflect the particular character of the violations suffered by [applicants] and to serve as a 
deterrent in respect of violations of a similar nature by the respondent State’.177 In Varnava 
and others v Turkey, the Court held that ‘It considers there to be little, if any, scope under the 
Convention for directing governments to pay penalties to applicants which are unconnected 
with damage shown to be actually incurred in respect of past violations of the Convention...’178  
In spite of this clear and consistent rejection of punitive damages, there are increasing 
voices both in academia and in judicial circles that argue that the ECHR – as a lex specialis 
system179 – allows for the imposition of such damages since it primarily does not function as 
an interstate dispute resolution mechanism.180 The focus on individual claims, it is argued, 
allows the European Court to depart from traditional international law and shift its approach to 
adopt punitive damages, especially in cases of gross violations of human rights; prolonged, 
deliberate non-compliance with a judgment of the Court; and severe curtailment of the 
applicant’s human rights, in particular restricting his or her access to the Court.181 In this 
context, some insist that a shift has already occurred and that the Court ‘has already changed 
its course and uses punitive damages, albeit rather implicitly.’182 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
(together with Anne van Aaken) for example argues that the Practice Directive ‘is no longer 
up to date.’183 He goes further and maps out seven ways in which the Court has implicitly 
applied punitive damages.184 Similarly, Dinah Shelton argues that ‘there seems to be some shift 
towards considering exemplary and aggravated damages, if not punitive measures.’185 She 
relies on the same arguments as provided by Pinto, as well as separate opinions made by other 
judges in which they expressly refer to awards in certain cases as punitive.186 The proposition 
is therefore that the Court has allowed aggravated, exemplary or even punitive damages. In the 
next sections I investigate two most-often cited examples in which it is argued such damages 
have been imposed implicitly.  
                                                 
176 In chronological order: Vilenchik v Ukraine, App No 21267/14, (ECtHR, 3 October 2017); , Greens and M.T. 
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1. Cases with no reported loss  
The first situation concerns cases in which applicants make no claim for compensation. In its 
Practice Directions the Court makes it explicit that the applicant ‘must make a specific claim’ 
for just satisfaction. If the applicant fails to comply with the requirement and makes no claim, 
the ‘Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.’187 This 
approach is consistent with the ‘[t]he inherent purpose’ of compensation to ‘place the injured 
party in the position in which he or she would have been had the violation found not taken 
place.’ When the injured party ‘does not even claim to have sustained any damage’, then – 
under the compensatory model – the Court should award no damages.188 As a matter of 
principle (‘ne ultra petitum rule’),189 therefore, victims that claim no compensation will receive 
no damages. In the words of the Inter-American Court ‘reparations should not make the victims 
or their successors either richer or poorer.’190 
Yet, as scholars note, the European Court has awarded compensation in certain cases 
in which the applicant has not asked for compensation or in which they failed to submit the 
claim within the required time limits. 191 The most recent of these cases was Nagmetov, in which 
the applicant’s son had been killed by police using firearms during a protest. The Court found 
a double violation of Article 2 of the Convention. In particular, the Court ruled that in addition 
to the substantive breach of Article 2 (unlawful and excessive use of lethal force), there were 
numerous shortcomings in the investigation and Russia had not provided any compensation for 
the killing over the nine years that had passed after the events. The applicant, however, made 
no request under Article 41 in the prescribed time-limit and the question arose whether the 
Court could award the applicant any damages. Relying on previous cases in which ‘the Court 
had exceptionally found it equitable to award compensation in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage, even where no such claim had been made’,192 the Chamber decided to make an award. 
The case then travelled to the Grand Chamber, so that it could clarify the practice of the Court, 
given that different sections of the Court adopted different approaches in these cases.193 The 
Grand Chamber asserted that the Court’s guiding principle was equity but that it also enjoyed 
‘a degree of flexibility’ in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Put together these principles 
required it to provide ‘an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable’, including 
not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. This 
meant that judges could exercise discretion in exceptional circumstances, where the gravity of 
the breach and its impact on the applicant were such that an adequate reparation was 
unavailable or restitution in integrum impossible. Since these elements were fulfilled in 
Nagmetov, it was thus appropriate for an award to be made.194  
In his article, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque (together with Anne van Aaken) suggests 
that ‘[w]hen the Court awards compensation in an amount higher than the alleged damage or 
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even independently of any allegation of damage, the nature of the just satisfaction is no longer 
compensatory, but we deem it punitive since it surpasses the amount claimed; i.e. the harm 
suffered by the victim.’195 In her book on Remedies in Human Rights Law, Shelton appears to 
make the same argument.196 But looking at the decision, the award is clearly not framed 
retributively. The focus of the Court is squarely on the applicant and how they have been 
impacted by the violation: ‘The non-pecuniary damage existed in the present case on account 
of the moral suffering and distress sustained by the applicant due to the unlawful and 
unjustified lethal use of firearms against his son and the incomplete investigation into the 
matter.’197 In other cases, in which the Court adopts a similar approach, it also argues that ‘the 
applicant must have suffered’198 or that ‘a mere finding of a violation’ cannot ‘compensate’ the 
‘distress and frustration resulting from the procedural violation of Article 3’.199 From these 
statements, it is clear that the Court is trying to impute suffering to the victim, a move that 
appears to seek to fit within the compensatory model.  
The Court does acknowledge that the ‘absolute nature of the right’ and ‘fundamental 
character’ of the right play a role in the award of non-pecuniary damages.200 Most of the 
decisions, in which the Court awards damages without a reported loss concern Articles 2 and 
3 (right to life and right to be free from torture).201 In this regard, the exception appears to apply 
only in those circumstances where scholars would argue punitive damages are appropriate and 
should be awarded – gross violations of human rights. It could therefore be argued that the 
Court is focused on vindicating the right in question and looks to its absolute nature and 
fundamental character and the importance of the interest it protects (including ‘human 
dignity’). Since the applicant did not ‘set a price’ on the right, it is the Court that feels 
compelled to do so. In this regard, the Court may be going beyond the ‘compensatory’ aim and 
affirming the importance of the violated right, but it is nevertheless far from imposing a 
punitive damage. If damages were punitive (or aggravated), they would seek to phrase the 
damages with reference to the wrongdoer, the violating state. Looking at the wording of the 
Court’s decisions, however, it appears that the Court is not focused on the conduct of the state, 
or its intentional or potentially cruel conduct. There is no mention that the award may be of 
punitive character; and even the dissenting judges do not label the award as intending to punish 
the state.202 Instead, the term ‘compensation’ appears countless times in the Nagmetov 
judgment, including a reference to the Chamber’s decision to exceptionally ‘award 
compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage’.203 
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Even if we accept Judge Pinto’s assessment that the Court’s recognition of punitive 
damages in this regard has been implicit, and that ‘[t]he fundamental purpose of that remedy 
[in Nagmetov] is hence to punish the wrongdoing State and prevent a repetition of the same 
pattern of wrongful action or omission by the respondent State and other Contracting Parties 
to the Convention,’ 204 it is clear that the current practice of the Court fails all three elements 
that are required to make Nagmetov type damages deterrent. The amount of the award made 
(50,000 Euros) is in line with other similar awards for violations of Article 2.205 It is phrased 
in ‘compensatory’ language. Finally, it is also entirely predictable: ‘[w]hat the Grand Chamber 
was being asked to do in the context of this referral was to resolve legal uncertainty as a result 
of the development of diverging case-law on the just satisfaction question outlined above 
(whereby some chambers award just satisfaction against some States in the absence of a claim 
while others, in cases concerning other States, do not).’206 Since the Grand Chamber has now 
ruled on this issue in order to clarify the Court’s approach and has created a precedent for all 
future cases in which no claim for damages is made, it has finally removed the last element – 
unpredictability – which could have potentially allowed previous decisions to have a deterrent 
impact. 207 
2. Interstate case: Cyprus v Turkey 
The interstate case Cyprus v Turkey is the second case in which the Court is thought to have 
implicitly awarded punitive damages. The initial judgment, which was rendered in 2001, found 
fourteen violations in relation to the situation in the northern part of Cyprus (the military 
intervention by Turkey in July and August 1974). These included the violation of the right to 
property and family life in relation to the homes and immovable property of displaced Greek 
Cypriots; the violation of prohibition of degrading treatment in respect of living conditions of 
Greek Cypriots in the Karpas region of the northern part of Cyprus; and a violation of the right 
to life in relation to Greek Cypriot missing persons and their relatives. From 2001 to 2012 and 
despite countless interventions by the Committee of Ministers little was done to redress the 
violations or indeed to compensate the suffering of victims and their heirs. In 2012, the case 
returned to the Court for the determination of just satisfaction. In the end in 2014, the Grand 
Chamber awarded the Cypriot Government aggregate sums of 30 million EUR for non-
pecuniary damage suffered by the surviving relatives of 1456 missing persons, and 60 million 
EUR for non-pecuniary damage suffered by the enclaved residents of the Karpas peninsula. 
 Judge Pinto in his concurring opinion labels these awards as punitive. The reasons for 
this are, Pinto argues, that the exact number of individual victims of human rights violations 
was not established, and in fact that the victims in the Karpas region were neither identified 
nor identifiable on the basis of the evidence in the file. The Court did not establish any criteria 
for the distribution of the compensation among the victims or their lawful heirs and did not 
provide any rules about devolution of compensation in cases where victims and their lawful 
heirs cannot be found. As Pinto puts it ‘in this eventuality, the claimant State will be the final 
beneficiary of the amounts paid by the respondent State. The punitive nature of this 
compensation is flagrant.’208 This statement might seem like a condemnation, but Pinto 
welcomes  
punitive damages [as] an appropriate and necessary instrument for fulfilling the Court’s 
mission to uphold human rights in Europe and ensuring the observance of the engagements 
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undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols ... This conclusion 
applies with even greater force in the case at hand, where the respondent State not only 
committed a multitude of gross human rights violations over a significant period of time in 
northern Cyprus, and did not investigate the most significant of these violations adequately 
and in a timely manner, but also deliberately failed year after year to comply with the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment on the merits delivered a long time ago with regard to these specific 
violations.209 
In comparison to Nagmetov, the award in Cyprus v Turkey is clearly unpredictable and 
the overall amount of the non-pecuniary compensation is high (due to the uncertain but high 
number of victims). However, as with Nagmetov, the majority opinion of the Court is at pains 
to underline that it in no way departs from previous case law. In this regard, the Court 
emphasizes that according to the very nature of the Convention, it is the individual, and not the 
State, who is directly or indirectly harmed and primarily ‘injured’ by a violation of one or 
several Convention rights. Therefore, if just satisfaction is afforded in an inter-State case, it 
should always be done for the benefit of individual victims. Citing the ICJ decision in Diallo,210 
the Court finds that the sum awarded to the applicant State in the exercise of diplomatic 
protection of its citizens is intended to provide reparation for the latter’s injury. Just satisfaction 
is awarded – the Court argues – to two sufficiently precise and objectively identifiable groups 
of people, that is, 1,456 missing persons and the enclaved Greek-Cypriot residents of the 
Karpas peninsula. The damages are not sought ‘with a view to compensating the State for a 
violation of its rights but for the benefit of individual victims.’211 In this regard, the receiving 
State is under an obligation to ‘transfer to the injured person any compensation obtained for 
the injury from the responsible State…’.212 
It is clear from these statements that the Court is trying to go no further than general 
international law allows. The damages – referred to again as compensation – are intended for 
the individual and not the State. Yet, the Court’s insistence on ‘compensation’ may also be 
strategic. By insisting on the compensatory nature of the award, the Court is counting on the 
fact that ‘it is often difficult to draw a line between damages designed to punish the wrongdoing 
state and purely compensatory damages taking into account the state’s degree of 
misconduct.’213 If compensatory nature of the damages is maintained, then perhaps the state is 
more likely to comply. In this respect, the Court is perhaps aware of studies which show that 
in contrast to controlled experiments on individuals, which speak in favour of retributive 
framing, in certain legal orders damages which are openly labelled as ‘punitive’ often go 
unenforced. Arbitral punitive damages for example are ‘generally not enforceable in 
jurisdictions that do not recognize this remedy.’ 214 Castagno observes that in countries like 
Italy and Germany, ‘the public policy defence … could … represent a strong bias against the 
enforcement of punitive damages awards’.215 He takes same view for the UK, considering that 
under English law, such relief is not available in contract cases.216 Beyond arbitral awards, 
similar trends have been noted even in domestic legal orders, which allow for such damages 
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(like the US). Although in those jurisdictions the enforcement of punitive damages may not be 
an issue, the practice shows that the awards are often reduced on appeal.217  
If – as Pinto argues – the Court is using damages ‘to prevent further violations of human 
rights and punish wrongdoing governments’,218 then perhaps the Court believes that 
‘covertness’ is a necessary element of achieving the aim pursued. In the context of international 
law, which relies heavily on states’ willingness to comply voluntarily with judicial decisions, 
judgments have to persuade states to accept and enforce the ultimate award. If states perceive 
damages as openly retributive, they may treat them as inappropriate and excessive and may as 
a consequence withhold compliance. In proceedings before the Court, Turkey for example 
explicitly argued against the use of punitive damages, reminding the Court that the Convention 
does not guarantee a right to punitive damages and that the case law has consistently rejected 
them.219 It insisted that no money should be paid for the unidentified beneficiaries. Since the 
decision was rendered in 2014, Turkey has consistently avoided calls to provide any response 
to the decision or information regarding when the payment would take place. At each of its 
meetings since June 2015, the Committee of Ministers recalled that the obligation to pay the 
just satisfaction awarded by the Court is unconditional and called upon the Turkish authorities 
to pay the sums awarded in the judgment. Yet Turkey’s silence continues even in the face of 
the expired time-limit (18 months), after which the default interest of 6% started to run. 
Compliance with the just satisfaction decision seems less and less likely.  
Yet, it is striking that since the 2014 decision was rendered, Turkey has in fact begun 
addressing the violations from the 2001 judgment. Within a few months of the 2014 decision, 
it started putting in place a domestic scheme for restitution, exchange or compensation for those 
deprived of property; it has also begun to provide access for experts to military zones, so that 
excavations of those missing can be started, as well as to archives to determine the location of 
remains, etc.220 The judgment therefore appears to have nudged the state to begin to address 
the underlying issues. In this regard, perhaps Pinto’s decision to openly call the award 
‘punitive’ (and/or the surprisingly high level of the award) may have helped nudge the state 
into action. It is possible that the 30 and 60 million payments will never be made,221 but the 
judgment was not without impact. If the aim of using punitive damages (implicitly or 
explicitly) is to trigger different behaviour from the state, then perhaps Cyprus v Turkey is a 
good beginning.  
5. Conclusion  
In this article, I show how the choice of remedy affects compliance and why aggravated or 
punitive damages look like an ideal option to nudge states into compliance. I explore recent 
arguments by scholars and judges who argue that the European Court of Human Rights should 
actively shift its approach (or perhaps already has) to nudge state behaviour towards 
compliance and prevention of future violations. However, based on my empirical research, I 
show that the current case law presents several obstacles to the introduction of punitive 
damages. Building on the economic analysis of the law and insights from behavioural sciences, 
I show how the Court’s approach fails to comply with any(!) of the elements needed to 
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incentivize states to change their behaviour, specifically the high value of awards, predictability 
and retributive framing. If damages should seek to incentivize states to change their behaviour 
and thus serve the purpose of deterrence, it is quite clear from the practice of the Court, that 
judges on the bench have actively avoided using damages for this purpose. Only in one decision 
– Cyprus v Turkey – the awards are sufficiently high and unpredictable, as well as having been 
openly called out as punitive, to fulfil the criteria of punitive damages. It is this decision that 
offers some indication of the implications of a potential shift in the remedy structure. Although 
the Court appears to be clearly resistant to the idea of punishing states through money, Cyprus 
v Turkey appears to suggest that unpredictable high value judgments may nudge states to begin 
to redress the underlying violation. Although in a system that relies on voluntary compliance 
such damages are unlikely to be paid out, they may nevertheless encourage states to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis and conclude that it is best to get rid of structural/systemic problems than 
to continue the violation.  
Cyprus v Turkey is of course an outlier and cannot persuasively and on its own reaffirm 
the idea of unpredictable, high value punitive damages; especially in light of such consistent 
case law to the contrary. Yet, the example shows that insights from behavioural economists 
could perhaps be applied even in state context and could be used to inform our thinking about 
the reform of the current remedy structure. Although states are not individuals and may not 
behave like individuals when it comes to money (eg when damages are called ‘punitive’, states 
are perhaps less likely to pay them), they may nevertheless react to a decision imposing such 
awards. And this reaction is often more than is triggered by existing monetary and non-
monetary remedies.  
